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Thank you very much, Professor O’Kelly, for that very kind introduction. I am delighted to be here and honored to take part in the dedication of the Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations, Law and Society.
Law is, in many ways, a backwards-looking field. We litigate over
facts that have already occurred, challenge deals that have already been
signed, and apply rules of decision based on previously-established
precedent or statutes already enacted. To the extent that this Center and
the symposium reflect on Berle’s work, they too are an exercise in looking back. Indeed, some might say the establishment of a Center named
in Berle’s honor is a monument to the past.
So, for a moment, let’s consider whether that’s such a good thing.
Any sort of monument carries the risk of freezing a moment in time or
rendering something fixed in place and content. Where the monument
you’re making is a piece of art capturing a fleeting moment of bliss, John
Keats would wholeheartedly approve. Keats’s Ode on a Grecian Urn
tells us that “happy” are the trees that “cannot shed [their] leaves nor ever bid the Spring adieu.” But what if the monument attempts to capture
and tell future generations of a particular figure’s greatness? Should we
then be talking about another poet—Percy Bysshe Shelley? Shelley’s
Ozymandias ridicules a now-battered and dilapidated statue erected to
honor the Egyptian Pharaoh Ramesses the Great.
So, which is it? Are we today dedicating a Keatsean “Attic shape”
that “dost tease us out of thought / as doth eternity,” or a Shelly-esque set
of “[t]wo vast and trunkless legs of stone / stand[ing] in the desert?”
I would suggest the answer is neither. No matter your view of the
aesthetic merits of Greek pottery or the utility of Egyptian relics, it is the
two poems themselves that bestow immortality on the “fair youth” depicted on the Grecian Urn in Keats’s Ode or the “king of kings” whose
statue has fallen into disrepair in Shelley’s Ozymandias. It is an immor-
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tality reinvigorated by every English student who writes an essay on
these poems or any judge who cites these English Romantic Poets in a
speech about a corporate law scholar. It is through this ongoing dialogue
with the text that the subject matter still lives.
Similarly, I don’t believe the mere establishment of a “Center” in
Adolf Berle’s honor does much one way or another to burnish or tarnish
his legacy and contributions. What does matter, however, is precisely
what this Center will foster, starting with this weekend’s symposium: a
dialogue that invests Berle and his important work with an immortality
of sorts. And when the many gifted scholars in attendance here make
their presentations, they will, I hope, do more than merely memorialize
Adolf Berle.
Berle, I believe, would have it no other way. He was, first and
foremost, a radical thinker—something that does not always go over well
in the backwards-looking field of law. Indeed, Berle was the kind of guy
that can make you feel bad about yourself. He was a very successful
lawyer, a groundbreaking scholar, a diplomat, an assistant secretary of
state, an ambassador, a speechwriter for the president, a policymaker,
and a member of FDR’s so-called “brain trust.” His resume alone probably deserves to have a Center built in its honor. But more than any of
these impressive credentials, he literally redefined the universe of American corporate law. I’ll leave it to the various scholars among us to explain and to analyze the more nuanced and subtle of Berle’s contributions; I want to talk about a few of the perhaps very obvious things,
things we take for granted.
First, Berle was one of the original scholars to recognize the core
concern of corporate law: the separation of ownership from control. As a
judge on the Delaware Court of Chancery, this particular observation is
in a very real sense a meaningful part of my day-to-day work. A great
number of the lawsuits that I hear arise from this tension. Of course,
Berle also recognized early on that the rise of institutional investors did
not mark the end of the ownership-control separation phenomenon. Instead, it simply added additional layers of complexity. Many institutional investors are themselves corporate (or corporate-like) entities that have
the same disparate, disconnected ownership characteristics as the mass of
individual shareholders. If these institutions function as passive investors, they simply widen the gap between corporate managers and the individuals in society that are the ultimate beneficial owners. If the institutions function as active shareholders, then control again is shifted—from
corporate managers to institutional managers—but ownership and control remain separate, and the phenomenon continues with the same intense debates about its implications.
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Second, having recognized this core concern about the separation of
ownership and control, Berle also offered advice on what to do about it.
Along with his partner, the economist Gardiner Means, Berle argued that
managers were “trustees” of the shareholders and that they could exercise the powers they had only for the benefit of those shareholders. In
other words, Berle articulated the governing premise of the fiduciary duties that now inform nearly every aspect of Delaware corporate law. As
professors Bratton and Wachter (both of whom are participating, I believe, in the symposium) noted in an article they published last year,
“[t]his was by no means a settled principle of law.”1
Third, Berle put this notion of fiduciary duties in context by articulating a two-part test for review of managerial action. The first level of
review is the technical power conferred on managers by articles of incorporation, bylaws, and statutory law. The second level of constraint consists of the common law fiduciary duties. This is where Berle’s work
touches my job, because he insisted that the judiciary had a legitimate
role to play in ensuring managers met their fiduciary duties to shareholders. It is particularly true in Delaware, where chancery and state supreme
court judges have broad powers of equity that enable them to ensure that
justice is done based on the unique facts of a given case. There are notable instances in Delaware case law where our courts have set aside the
actions of management even though those actions were technically legal.
Almost forty years ago, for example, in a case styled Schnell v. Chris
Craft Industries, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court strongly rejected the
notion that directors’ compliance with the general statutory law was all
that was required to meet their obligations.
The equitable principles of fiduciary duty, the Schnell Court held,
would overlay and constrain the statutory powers of directors. This was
not innovative; instead, it was part of the longstanding operation of our
law and a manifestation of a principle that Berle initially offered.
These basic principles have spurred intense debate ever since Berle
first articulated them. It is a debate that still rages today. For example,
the separation of ownership and control phenomenon is at the heart of the
current shareholder-rights movement. It also influences other timely
corporate law debates, including proposals to federalize corporate law.
Berle’s fundamental observation—which is today widely accepted as
true—has nonetheless generated a pitched debate as to its precise implications. Scholars, academics, and policymakers, although they credit
Berle for his seminal observation, posit widely divergent arguments as to

1. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins:
Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 108 (2008).
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what Berle’s observation means for corporation law and broader public
policy.
As I said before, I hope that despite this Center’s quite proper affection for Adolf Berle, the participants in this weekend’s symposium and
future symposia will freely wrestle with and challenge every assumption
he made and every conclusion he reached. This is actually a wholesome
thing, for as the Scottish philosopher David Hume observed, “Truth
springs from argument amongst friends.” This should not be any less so
in academic or political circles. And in the final analysis, I am confident
we will find that corporate law has been made all the better because of
the intense debate over the implications of Berle’s core observations
about the separation of ownership and control.
Finally, we should keep in mind that Berle made some of his most
important and game-changing observations in the midst of the Great Depression—a time of unprecedented political and economic upheaval, a
time not altogether unlike the present. Then, as now, questions loomed
about how to regulate corporate conduct and about the proper role the
government should play in that regulation. Astutely, Berle recognized
that the stakeholders in this debate were more than just the stockholders
and the managers of any particular corporation—they also included society in general. This, then, is the debate we must have. What is the
purpose of a corporation? How does it best create wealth and serve the
interests of society? It is precisely the kind of “argument among friends”
that I referenced earlier, that this new Center is uniquely positioned to
facilitate.
And, if anything, the stakes have only grown since Berle’s time.
While the pertinent question in the 1930s was whether the corporate law
of an individual American state could temper the exercise of an American corporation acting on a national scale, today the question is whether
the globalization of product and capital markets has made it impossible
for nation states—even the United States—to effectively regulate corporate behavior. Berle lived and wrote in a time of substantial economic
uncertainty and on the heels of marked changes in corporate America.
He thought deeply about the causes of the economic crisis that confronted his generation, the changing role of corporations in society, and
the appropriate legal responses to both.
Berle articulated his
groundbreaking conceptions of the corporation in a cogent and thoughtful fashion, unafraid to lend his voice to the ongoing debate. Many of
his ideas influenced the New Deal policies of the Roosevelt administration, which brought permanent changes in the American economy and
culture. To be sure, Adolf Berle’s ideas did not put to rest the ongoing
discussion about the proper role of government or of corporations in
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American society. Nor would we want it to do so. So long as America is
comprised of free thinkers in a robust democracy it is inconceivable that
anyone could put these great debates to rest. But what Adolf Berle did
was to contribute to the discussion in a significant and permanent way.
And now it is our turn to do the same. Berle contributed enormously to the corporate legal landscape, and we owe it to him to ensure that
this Center, named in his honor, does not “decay” into a “colossal wreck”
like the statue of Ramesses that so fascinated Shelley. Instead, let it be
like the poem itself, an enduring source of inspiration and challenge.
I have a hunch that the Center will succeed because its first director
is Professor Charles O’Kelly. Like Adolf Berle, Charles O’Kelly is a
corporate law scholar (and an expert on Delaware corporate law, I might
add), and Chuck’s professional life also has been devoted to continuing
and enriching the debate about the purpose of the corporation in our society and to offering real world solutions for the problems we confront.
Frankly, I cannot imagine a more appropriate and fitting director for the
Adolf Berle Center. And so, I want to congratulate Professor O’Kelly
publicly, and wish him, and Seattle University, the best with the new
Center.
Thank you very much for inviting me to be with you today.

